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For most philosophers the coexistence of many legal orders in the world does not pose deep theoretical problems or puzzles. The variety of legal orders in the world is something well understood by the tradition of political and moral thought. Montesquieu, for example, describes the variety of laws that he observes in his own life time with great eloquence and without any alarm. He arrives at a general principle as follows: ‘the government most in conformity with nature is the one whose particular arrangement best relates to the disposition of the people for whom it is established’ and adds: ‘Laws should be so appropriate to the people for whom they are made that it is very unlikely that the laws of one nation can suit another’.​[1]​ This is no eccentric position and its essence has not changed with time. Contemporary lawyers and philosophers frequently accept, in practice as well as in theory, that a legal system operates under its own terms and is shaped by its own participants. Any problems posed by the plurality of legal orders in the world are to be dealt with by each legal order separately. So private persons that are caught in transnational disputes because they are subject to two or more jurisdictions, have recourse to private international law, which is always part of domestic law, i.e. the law where the case happens to arise.
But this analysis does not capture international law. This is, or appears to be, a distinct legal order that is certainly not the law of a distinct nation or a people but aspires to cover the whole of the world and – perhaps surprisingly – does seem to meet many of the ordinary criteria of a legal order. Also known as the law of nations or the law of states, international law covers governments and officials in a way that escapes all domestic orders. Whereas private international law is part of domestic law, public international law is taken to be another legal order of its own above all the domestic ones. We often refer to this arrangement as the international legal system, without specifying if we are referring to resulting multiplicity of legal systems or just to the international domain. In any event the distinct system of what is known as public international law cannot be dealt with by the same tools that account for foreign law because it is not symmetrically placed to all the others.
	The idea of ‘system’ is here the key. According to what may be the orthodox view among international lawyers, the distinction between domestic and international law is both one of content, in that domestic law is about individuals whereas international law about states, but also one of form, because the two are also distinct legal systems. According to this view, the plurality of legal orders as distinct legal systems is explained by the fact that law is nothing more than a mundane instrument of government. If law is just a conventional creation of each political community according to its own political processes, then the variety of laws just matches the variety of communities and that all there is to it. The diversity of laws is seen as something not unlike the diversity of languages. The conventional emergence and peaceful co-existence of linguistic communities does not in any way threaten the coherence of any one of them. We say ‘law’ and they say ‘droit’ or ‘Recht’ and that is all. There is no reason to choose the best term or the best language. Indeed, the very question of the most appropriate term across languages would be an absurdity. By extension of the same point, the orthodox view of international law suggests, that since every legal order is a conventional creation then perhaps  international law is also an ordinary conventional creation – perhaps incomplete - of officials or other relevant institutions (or simply, state action) in the context of international relations. 
But, when looked at more closely, it is very hard to substantiate this view and establish any theoretical analogy between the domestic legal system and the international legal system. Who ‘makes’ international law and who applies it? Who are its ‘officials’? What is its constitutional framework? Which government is it the instrument of? These questions have very elusive answers in the international context.​[2]​ For that reason, the international legal order cannot be usefully compared to any of the domestic ones. Nevertheless, international law is routinely taken to be law, just like domestic law. Scholarly studies, such as new books by Yuval Shany and George Letsas, freely compare international and national law and explore the ways in which these separate legal orders (separate but both ‘legal’ in exactly the same way) interact. Shany’s book focuses on the competing jurisdictions of national and international courts, whereas Letsas discusses ideas of human rights in the European Convention and in domestic legal orders. Both these books show that, whatever its historical character, international law is clearly becoming more and more relevant to domestic law-makers and adjudicators on account of its content. They offer many important examples of overlapping legal regulation and jurisdiction. 
In fact, more and more practising lawyers observe that international law and national law do not have entirely different content any more. They note that there are now very important overlaps in both their immediate subject matter and overall purpose. Lord Bingham, who is both one of the most distinguished and of the most experienced judges in the United Kingdom, has recently made precisely this observation with his customary eloquence and precision: 

I used to be much attracted by the description of public international law as ‘The Law of Nations’. It seemed to reflect the lustre of Gentili and Grotius, to invest the subject with a grandeur and dignity separating it from the mundane concerns of everyday life, to conjure up a vision of proud and equal sovereigns, declining to bow the knee to one another but condescending to parley through the medium of their immune envoys. I now think … that the expression, if not actually pernicious, is better avoided. For although international law comprises a distinct and recognizable body of law with its own rules and institutions, it is a body of law complementary to the national laws of individual states, and in no way antagonistic of them; it is not a thing apart; it rests on similar principles and pursues similar ends; and observance of the rule of law is quite as important on the international plane as on the national, perhaps even more so.​[3]​

The key to this change must be that international law now engages very strongly with the fate of individuals, either as business players or as victims of state action. In his book Lord Bingham gives several examples touching on the relevance of the principle of international rule of law on the life of individuals, e.g. war detainees or terror suspects. International lawyers give many such examples. In an influential overview, Anne Marie Slaughter wrote of the global economy crating ‘global litigation’ and described a process by which we see the emergence of an ‘integrated system of law’, in which courts go beyond ‘the comity of nations’ in engaging in dialogue with one another in transnational disputes.​[4]​ The nature of these disputes is such that courts of different legal systems may well come to face them at the same time. There many other examples of similar arguments.​[5]​
	This takes us perhaps back to the views of Montesquieu because, even though he had not seen the flourishing of public international law, for him the law of nations and the law of a political society were manifestations of the same idea: law. But law for Montesquieu was not just the instrument of government. Montesquieu was part of tradition of political thought that had not heard of legal positivism and for which law was one element of the realisation of a moral ideal of the state.  So he reserved for this ideal the term ‘droit’ as opposed to the simpler ‘loi’ (translated in the recent Cambridge edition into ‘Right’ as opposed to ‘law’). So he writes: 

Considered as inhabitants of a planet so large that different peoples are necessary, they have laws bearing on the relations that these peoples have with one another, and this is the RIGHT OF NATIONS. Considered as living in a society that must be maintained they have laws concerning the relation between those who govern and those who are governed, and this is the POLITICAL RIGHT. Further, they have laws concerning the relations that all citizens have with one another, and this is the CIVIL RIGHT.​[6]​
	
So Montesquieu gives us the intimations – although nothing more - of a different account of international law, according to which it is parallel to national law not because of the formal account of ‘legal systems’, but thorough a substantive account of the content and purpose of law as ‘droit’ and not merely as ‘loi’.​[7]​
As the lawyers I cited above realise, the question of the status and nature of international law is no more just a philosophical question. It has become an urgent and current question of practice. It is a question that ultimately wins cases or deflects their pursuit by the other side. In their daily practice judges and lawyers in England encounter very regularly European Union law, which may be considered a special case, but also the refugee conventions, environmental conventions and of course human rights conventions. These are all manifestations of international law, creations of what we could call loosely the ‘international legal order’. We have now, therefore, new questions arising before our own courts. What happens when domestic law and international law cover the same subject matter in different ways? Lord Bingham uses several examples. But an instructive example, unique in its directness, is used by Yuval Shany in his new book Regulating Jurisdictional Relations between National and International Courts. In Medellin v Dretke​[8]​ the US Supreme Court had to deal with the issue of the fate of a Mexican national who had been sentenced to death - for the rape and murder of two teenage girls - by a court in Texas without his rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations having been respected. The International Court of Justice had already ruled in Avena​[9]​ that the US had failed to respect its obligations as to consular notification in this particular case and required the US to take – unspecified – remedial action. Importantly, the International Court of Justice did not require the annulment of any of the convictions. But it required the United States to respond through its own courts to the failure to respect the consular arrangements. Nevertheless, the US Supreme Court ruled, in a majority judgment, that the ICJ judgment does not of its own force constitute binding federal law and refused to accept any challenge to the conviction and sentence of the Mexican national (who was duly executed immediately thereafter). 
The conflict generated here was direct and dramatic. Either the capital punishment was lawful or it was not. In the end, it was held lawful and applied with ferocious speed and efficiency a few hours after the Supreme Court’s judgment to dispel, perhaps, any lingering doubts about the direct link between the two events. But the international court’s ruling had sought to have a direct bearing on a subject matter traditionally associated with the national jurisdiction, namely the rights of the accused in a criminal trial, an attempt that, seemingly, failed. The proliferation of international courts and tribunals over the last twenty years suggests that such dramatic choices will become for more frequent. How are we to resolve these potential conflicts and overlaps in judicial powers and judgments? How are the courts to deal with them?
	The obvious answer, obvious at least to legal scholars, is that we ought to resolve them by way of law, real law, not fake law that masks the caprice of state power. But what law could possibly cover the relations between legal systems?  We have just said that a conventional view is that international law and national law form different legal systems. And we also say that laws become laws because of the existence of a legal system and through the operation of conventional procedures and techniques that exist in a legal system. But what law can exist for the relations among legal systems? It follows that there cannot be any such law for any such law would exist outside all systems. 
Just like all ordinary words take their meaning and content from the language to which they belong and nothing outside this language, similarly, a law takes its meaning and content from the system to which it belongs and which creates it. So the law of legal systems  - or the law of laws - must belong to a system that encompasses the totality of legal systems in the world. This is, I take it, the point of Hans Kelsen’s monism about international law. Failing that, there can be no such ‘law of laws’. Or so suggests a very prominent view of law and legal system associated with legal positivism, for which international law is not really law. But this view is under strain because, as Yuval Shany’s book suggests in some detail, there are such laws of laws in operation as we speak. And if such laws are truly laws then the theory that laws are created by legal systems must be wrong. 

2. LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM

What is exactly the relation between law and legal system? Both Shany and Letsas touch on this issue but do not pause to examine it. Before we look into their books in detail I think we need to return to this preliminary question. The idea of a legal system will determine how we read the problem of the relation between national and international law as such systems. Or at least this is a view that derives from the thought of the leading legal positivists, Hart and Raz, whose writings remain hugely influential. 
The original link between laws and legal system was made by Hart in the Concept of Law.  Whereas social rules of conduct can exist whenever people adopt the internal point of view, such rules do not by themselves constitute legal rules. A special structure is necessary, which Hart called the ‘union’ of primary and secondary norms. So Hart wrote that the legal system marks the development from a pre-legal to a legal world. The emergence of rules of recognition, adjudication and change, he said, ‘together are enough to convert the regime of primary rules into what is indisputably a legal system’.​[10]​ The central elements of Hart’s idea of law, namely the idea of legal validity and of the ‘union’ of primary and secondary rules makes sense only in the context of a legal system. This is what, I suppose, Hart means by the union of primary and secondary rules. 
This determined Hart’s view of international law as follows: 

Different interpretations of the phenomena to be observed are of course possible; but it is submitted that there is no basic rule providing general criteria of validity for the rules of international law, and that the rules which are in fact operative constitute not a system but a set of rules, among which are the rules providing for the binding force of treaties.​[11]​

It follows that international law is not a proper legal system and that international law is not proper law.  
A similar position, although less explicit about international law, is offered by Joseph Raz. His view is, very broadly, that laws are created by the legal system, but that the legal system itself is not a pure legal creation: 

Every state –by which is meant a form of political system and not a juristic person – has one legal system that constitutes the law of that state, and every municipal legal system is the law of one state. Since, then, the identity of a legal system is bound up with that of the state the law of which it is, the relation between law and state necessarily affects the problem of scope.​[12]​

In his discussion of the institutional nature of law Raz leaves it open that international law may be a proper legal system.​[13]​ But in the end, he agrees with Hart that only states can have legal systems, because his account of legal system requires a strong rule of recognition and consistent practices of officials, features that are evidently absent from international relations.​[14]​
There have been suggestions that Hart’s view of the legal system should not be taken at face value, because legal systems can be defined in a more sociological or in any event looser way. But the risk of more sociologically informed theories is that they end up with a theory that is virtually empty of content. So one sociologist of law tells us, for example, that law is ‘whatever people identify and threat through their social practices as ‘law’’.​[15]​ But then anything at all can count as law and a legal system. Contradictory ideas and systems could end up being law and legal systems. If we accepted this view of law, our philosophical search will have ended at a dead end. No criterion or set of criteria would be in a position to guide us identify and discuss ‘law’ and ‘legal system’. Moreover, such a theory would not help us at all in a case when it appears that two legal systems are both apparently valid (perhaps accepted by different groups of ‘officials’) for the same transaction or state of affairs.
A significant advantage of the Hart and Raz position is that the problem that I have called ‘the law of laws’ does not arise. If international law is not a legal system then its products are not laws. If so, then there is no need to co-ordinate national and international laws and courts. No higher accommodation is needed, since international law is only apparently law and its courts are only apparently courts. The world of international relations, thus, does not truly engage or much less conflict with national law. What emerges is a theoretical position about law that could be called ‘national monism’. In other words, if the law is exhaustively determined by the national sources, determined only by the political society according to its own legal system, then this is the only relevant system in the world. There cannot be a conflict with another system. Acts and events at the international level assume any legal significance they may have under terms set by the national legal system alone.
From the perspective of national monism the problem faced by the Supreme Court in Medellin, namely the existence of a direct judgment of the International Court of Justice, was merely a domestic legal question and only a political international question. The ICJ’s judgment was something to be taken account of (as all political facts are to be taken account of), but not an eo ipso source of legal rights and obligations. The judgment lay outside the only relevant legal system, namely the legal system of the United States. 
The problem with this position, clear as it is, is that it is far too extreme. It allows for the parallel co-existence of national legal orders but not for international law. No national court accepts such a position, since all national courts treat international law with at least a modicum of respect as law. Even the Supreme Court rejects it. Chief Justice Roberts reasoned as follows: 

No one disputes that the Avena decision—a decision that flows from the treaties through which the United States submitted to ICJ jurisdiction with respect to Vienna Convention disputes—constitutes an international law obligation on the part of the United States. But not all international law obligations automatically constitute binding federal law enforceable in United States courts. The question we confront here is whether the Avena judgment has automatic domestic legal effect such that the judgment of its own force applies in state and federal courts.​[16]​ 

So the United States Supreme Court recognises that there are legal obligations on the United States that do not derive from the domestic legal system, even if these obligations are not directly enforceable before national courts. But this view is not compatible with the views of the legal system put forward by Hart and Raz. If the international legal order cannot be a legal system, then there cannot be international legal obligations at all and the US is not bound by any such law. If Chief Justice Roberts saw law in the way suggested by the theories of law and legal system offered by Hart and Raz he would have said that whatever the International Court of Justice did was outside the only relevant legal system. It could not, therefore, be creating any legal obligation.  
There is no need to multiply the examples. We saw that such ‘national monism’ is also very clearly rejected by Lord Bingham, whose views may be taken to represent at least a widely held view in the common law world.  So we must conclude that a theory of law must find a way of considering international law as law. It must have a way of recognising that there are other legal systems or sources of law in the world and that part of law’s task is to sort out these relations by way of law. But how can we have a law of legal systems and a legal regulation of their courts? What is, and how can there be, a law of laws? This is the question that Yuval Shany sets out to address.

3.	THE PROBLEM OF JURISDICTIONS: SHANY

Professor Shany’s book is not a book of jurisprudence. It is a work of scholarship in international law and a very impressive one at that. It is a work of great learning. Its subject matter is the possible regulation in international law of relations between international and national courts.​[17]​ I cannot here do justice to the many arguments of this splendid book, which ranges over many different areas of international law. But one of the book’s unique merits is that it is animated by a clear theoretical aim.  It is this agenda that I shall focus on. One of the book’s problems is that it never sufficiently engages with its main theoretical aim.  
The book proposes a set of general principles for regulating what he calls ‘jurisdictional interactions between national and international courts’ with the general aim of equipping the judges involved ‘with flexible problem-solving powers that should harmonize different normative orders’.​[18]​ Shany’s pragmatic view seeks to bypass, he says, ‘some of the long-running disputes concerning the nature of the relations between national and international courts and to offer a pragmatic methodology, applicable across the board to all international dispute settlement procedures’.​[19]​ Professor Shany modestly suggests that his positive proposals ‘could likely circumvent the need to select a governing theoretical paradigm of the relationship [between national and international courts]’​[20]​ but in my view some such paradigm does emerge with some clarity. In fact, the book’s argument rests on an implicit theoretical assumption, namely that the issue of the relations between national and international courts (and by implication of national and international law) is not a matter of ‘legal systems’ but a matter of substantive principles of legality. It resolves the question of the law of laws but disconnecting the idea of law from the straitjacket of a Hartian ‘legal system’. Law is not a system of primary and secondary rules nor is it a matter of a chain of authorisation.
	Professor Shany does not put it exactly in those terms, but he comes close. For when he speaks of the ‘functions’ of law and of international law, he has in mind a clear aspiration to match the normal features of the rule of law. He writes as follows:

While national and international courts do not function as a unitary judicial system, they sometimes apply a common body of law – specifically, international law. The norms of international law do possess, arguably, coherence and organization-generating features: they derive their legitimacy from a common normative source they are identified by common rules of recognition … they include certain hierarchical features, they comprise primary and secondary norms linked through operative relations and they serve a common yet amorphic global constituency. This configuration arguably reveals hidden systemic aspirations – the international normative system’s marked inclination to maintain internal  coherence and organization.​[21]​

Because both national and international institutions are committed to the idea of the rule of law, their tasks are similar. And because they are so similar, then ‘this duty to faithfully to apply international law can be derived either from international law itself, or from domestic law rules that refer national courts to apply international law’.​[22]​ At another place he speaks of the common ‘policy interests’, namely procedural justice, efficiency and legal coherence, pursued by national and international law.​[23]​ 
Another clear statement of this view (although not put as the author’s own) is as follows: 

[O]ne may posit that national and international courts could, at least in some cases, be viewed as engaged in a common functional and normative enterprise: the settlement of disputes and the development and of comparable norms (sometimes even derived from the same normative sources).​[24]​

I will call this view of international law the ‘substantive theory’, because it judges international law on the basis of its substantive contents. I will return to it below.
The emphasis of the book is not, however, on such general theoretical issues, but on a practical elaboration of the law. Here lies its great significance for any legal theorist interested in international legal structures: the book shows us now the substantive theory of international law might be able to find expression in detailed legal doctrine. Shany’s analysis borrows from existing examples of how courts have dealt with overlapping jurisdiction.  
Shany organises the relevant ‘jurisdiction-regulating rules’ of current international law into three groups.​[25]​ The first group comprises ‘choice of forum rules – i.e. general freedom of choice principles and specific forum selection arrangements, ranging from exclusive jurisdiction to residual jurisdiction clauses’.​[26]​ The second group comprises ‘multiple proceedings-regulating norms, comprised of the principles of election (electa una via or ‘fork in the road’) lis alibi pendens, and res judicata’​[27]​. The third group is a proposal of ‘flexible’ rules, such as ‘comity and abuse of right’, which Shany elsewhere calls ‘soft harmonizing tools’.​[28]​ All such rules, for Shany, could be applied in the future in resolving the questions of jurisdiction between national and international courts.
	The first group of rules would apply whenever a dispute were to be allocated between courts within the same legal system. These are ‘choice of forum rules’ based on a previous contract between the parties. However, this rule can have limited application outside commercial disputes. Shany also includes in this chapter a discussion of treaty provisions excluding choice of forum, e.g. article 23 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding. But any such rules will be hard to envisage. 
The second group of rules concerns ‘multiple proceedings-regulating norms’, namely a case when more than one proceedings have already been initiated. Shany borrows here three rules form national and international law: ‘electa una via’, ‘lis alibi pendens’ and ‘res judicata’. The first rule is a principle of election, which applies as an ‘estoppel’ rule. It bars a party from applying to a particular forum if that party has already litigated the same dispute elsewhere. Shany recognises that this is currently a weak rule in international law. The second rule, ‘lis alibi pendens’, bars a party from starting new litigation if a case – on the same cause of action - is pending elsewhere.  This rule is familiar in private international law and is now part of the Brussels Regulation in the EU. Shany again notes that there is very sparse precedent to this effect in international law. The third rule, ‘res judicata’, is also familiar form private international law and it probably constitutes a general principle of law applicable both in national and international law (as Shany notes).​[29]​ Again, however, the rule has limited practical significance in cases where international and national courts may be taken to be dealing with a different cause of action, i.e. different legal bases. 
Shany writes that both the first and the second group of rules are implausible. He writes that ‘the scope of application of such forum-selection arrangements, as well as the very applicability of rules designed to govern multiple proceedings … appears to be mired in conceptual confusion’​[30]​ although it is not clear why this must be the case. He also writes that such rules depend on ‘a conceptualization of national and international courts as judicial bodies operating within the legal system’.​[31]​ But this theoretical understanding blocks the applicability any international rule whatsoever. This was the problem with the Hartian theory of law and legal system, which Shany here implicitly (and inconsistently) endorses. In any event, his proposal is that the third set of rules does not face such difficulties.
The third set of rules includes ‘flexible jurisdiction-regulating rules’. Shany discusses two of them: comity and abus de droit. Both such rules afford ‘a wide measure of discretion on the courts applying them’.​[32]​ Comity ‘calls on courts to defer, when appropriate, to other courts and to treat their procedures and decisions with courtesy and respect’.​[33]​ For Shany, comity has ‘considerable potential for alleviating some of the more difficult aspects of jurisdictional competition’ and ‘represents a strategy for soft coordination and harmonization between the entire gamut of jurisdictional configurations’.​[34]​ It does so by encouraging dialogue and improving the outcomes of judicial decisions, without imposing rigid duties on courts. Shany discusses many criticisms of comity but omits the most important one: it may have no content. What does it mean to show ‘courtesy and respect’? It does not entail following the judgments of other courts. Shany has this to say about it:

The discretionary nature of judicial comity could thus serve as an important check on the operation of international courts by enabling national courts to mitigate the effects of improper or illegitimate international adjudication. This filtering process ensures that international procedures and decisions conform to basic local principles of justice and confers at the same time some domestic legitimacy on international adjudication.​[35]​

Yet, the ideas of ‘courtesy and respect’ do not provide any criteria for providing adequate ‘filter’. What is an ‘illegitimate’ international judgment? Shany only says – responding to a different objection – that ‘the modest degree of mutual influence facilitated by comity is preferable to the total normative detachment that a bar on comity, or an excessively rigid jurisdiction-regulation rule’ would entail… Under present conditions, judicial comity might also represent the most far-reaching yet still politically palatable framework for cooperation just because it balances mutual respect with distrust’.​[36]​
	The principle of abuse of rights provides:  ‘that rights cannot be applied in a malicious manner with the sole intent of causing harm to others, in a fictitious manner (for a purpose totally different to that [for] which the right was created), in a wholly unreasonable manner causing harm disproportionate to the interests of the right-holder, or in disregard of the rights and obligation of other parties’.​[37]​ A different problem arises here. This problem will apply to a very small number of cases, if any at all.  For Shany, abuse of rights can help regulate the relations between a national and international court. This may be the case, but the scope of the rule seems quite narrow. 
	In any event, these ‘flexible rules’ about jurisdiction are Shany’s positive proposal. Yet, they leave most of the problems of the relations between national and international law unsolved. For example, they have nothing to say as to how the US Supreme Court should have dealt with the Medellin case. Did the US court show appropriate comity? Perhaps it did, perhaps it did not. No other of the ‘jurisdictional’ rules proposed by Shany seems to come into play. 
	The real issue at stake at Medellin was not the jurisdiction of courts. It was the effect of a treaty of public international law into the US legal order. But Shany’s arguments do not engage with that deeper problem at all. The book promises more than it actually delivers, because it keeps its focus on procedural rules alone. But it is obvious that the relations between national and international courts is not an issue of civil procedure. Precisely because they appear to be parts of separate ‘legal systems’, there is no single civil procedure that applies to them. This is a deeper theoretical problem that Shany does not tackle directly. 

4.	A ‘SUBSTANTIVE THEORY’ OF INTERNATIONAL LAW?

Shany’s book maintains a very narrow focus on issues of jurisdiction. It discusses the jurisdiction of courts form the point of view of international law. Yet, it does not define what ‘jurisdiction’ may be anywhere in the book. ‘Jurisdiction’ does not appear on the index. In his introduction he mentions the ‘interaction’ of national and international courts, which is not the same thing as the overlap or conflict of jurisdiction. The division of labour between courts is not the same thing as the issue of the limits of their jurisdiction. 
Jurisdiction is a slippery concept in law. In international law it applies to the whole range of powers of a state, executive, legislative and adjudicative.​[38]​ In civil procedure it concerns the particular powers of a court to give lawful judgment. But this is not a difficult problem. For example CPR 30 provides for the transfer of proceedings from one court to another within the same legal system of England and Wales. The real problem, and the problem that motivates Shany’s book, is the relation between courts that belong to different ‘legal systems’, namely the national and international legal system. 
	Shany discusses the relations between international and national law in his chapter two, which is entitled ‘Conceptualizing the Relations between National and International Courts’. As we saw above, Shany thinks that such theories are not helpful. But he does not explain why. He favours practical and functional solutions. But that is a theory itself. 
	First, Shany rejects dualism. But he defines dualism in a very strange way (at least from the point of view of general jurisprudence). He thinks that ‘dualism posits that national and international law are separate and independent legal systems that operate on different planes – specifically, the intra-state and the inter-state levels… This separateness between the two bodies of law is characterized … by a normative gulf’.​[39]​ As he puts it a little later: ‘dualism denies the existence of normative contact points between the two jurisdictions’.​[40]​ But if this is so, how come states incorporate international law? I think that the position Shany describes is not dualism but national monism, which I attributed above to Hart and Raz. Dualism, as the name suggests, considers that there are two types of law and two legal orders, national and international (I say ‘orders’ to avoid identification with the Hartian framework). If there are two legal orders, however, that are self-consciously ‘dualist’ they are such orders because they recognise the other as law. If so, then there are indeed normative contacts between the two, at least to the extent that they exhibit some sort of mutual respect as legal orders and not as simple structures of power and authority. This is shown by the fact that national legal orders freely incorporate international law as law (i.e. international law made according to its own doctrine of grounds of law or sources, over which national law has no say) and by the fact that international law relies on national  laws for the effective application of most international law rules (again, relying on the domestic doctrine of grounds of law or sources of law, over which it has no say). Dualism is both a framework for national legal orders and a framework for the international legal order, something which Shany explicitly recognises. Of course, dualism properly understood poses its own problems because it cannot be serviced by the Hartian model of the legal system. For that reason, dualism is also distinct from ‘monism’. Nevertheless, dualism does not entail the separation and mutual ignorance of the two relevant legal orders or systems. It suggests a mutual respect on the basis of a substantive division of labour.
	Shany also discusses a distinct model for the relations between national and international law, which he calls ‘hierarchy’. This is an innovation as far as legal philosophy is concerned because the major legal philosophers have not moved beyond monism, dualism and – more recently – ‘pluralism’. In any event, ‘hierarchy’ is the view according to which national and international courts are hierarchically ‘configured’. But by what law can they be so configured? The very idea of a system of hierarchy points to a pre-existing monist framework for national and international law. For Shany hierarchy ‘negates the possibility of viewing parallel proceedings as judicial alternatives to one another’.​[41]​ This may be true, but precisely for that reason hierarchy does not make sense outside a monist framework. So what Shany has in mind, although does not say so, must be some version of monism – and the examples he gives come only from international courts​[42]​. Nevertheless, Shany discusses ‘hierarchy’ as a national response. I find this part of the book very puzzling, but it does not actually interfere with the rest of the argument. 
	Finally, Shany discusses Kelsen’s monism and George Scelle’s ‘dèdoublement fonctionnel’, the ‘American School of Informal Socialization’ and ‘pluralism’.​[43]​ All such theories have in common the challenge to the ‘traditional dichotomy’ between national and international law and they are therefore warmly welcomed. They are deployed in an all out attack on ‘dualism’ and ‘hierarchy’. Although the discussion of these ideas is rather quick, Shany concludes in an interesting way:

Normative systemization – i.e. the acknowledgment that international law itself contains systemic features – might overcome some of the difficulties that the conflicting structural and anti-structuralist approaches raise. Hence, the proper field for exploring the relationship national and international courts might be not the institutional field but, rather, the normative arena.​[44]​

This conclusion brings Shany close to the substantive theory of international law as the ‘right of nations’ that we saw in Montesquieu. Unfortunately, this insight is not developed any further. In fact, it is quickly dismissed in the next paragraph when Shany writes that no theory can resolve the problem at hand because it does not meet universal acceptance. But if the proper terrain for such a theory is that of normative relations (presumably of international rule of law and international justice) then it is certain that there will be rival opinions and interpretations and no ‘universal acceptance’. This is the nature of the normative. So in the end the substantive theory of international law and institutions is absent from the book. 
	The positive proposals for international jurisdictional rules put forward by Shany make sense only within one such theory. But such a theory remains frustrating underdeveloped in Shany’s book. I do not think that a set of policy reasons for better adjudication can lead us to a substantive concept or theory of international law. Lacking such a theory, Shany’s general attacks on what he misleadingly calls ‘dualism’ ring somewhat hollow.
Since a universal law of civil procedure will be as elusive as ‘the law of laws’, the answer to the dilemmas of international law must be the overthrow of the idea of a Hartian legal system (on the basis of a rule of recognition or chain of authorisation and the like) and its replacement by a substantive criterion for a legal order under the criteria of legality.​[45]​ Such a substantive theory of law, which includes international law, was intimated in the text by Montesquieu with which we started these reflections, for Montesquieu speaks of the ‘right of nations’ and of ‘political right’ (in both cases ‘droit’) which share a normative basis in ‘the constitution of our being’.​[46]​ He contrasts this to positive laws (or ‘loi’) that are of secondary importance and are made by each political society according to its own system of government. Similar theories of law that include international law have been put forward, as is well known, by Rousseau and Kant and of course many contemporary political philosophers, such as Rawls, Dworkin and Nagel. We find a sophisticated ‘substantive’ theory of law on the basis of the value of legality in Nigel Simmonds’ recent book Law as a Moral Idea, from which international law has perhaps a great deal to learn.​[47]​ 

5.	A SUBSTANTIVE IDEA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS: LETSAS 

By contrast, George Letsas’s book, A Theory of Interpretation of the ECHR, offers a fully substantive theory of interpretation of the European Convention of Human Rights. This is – formally – a sub-area of international law, although it has entirely distinct features. The subject matter of the ECHR is precisely the way that states treat those under their jurisdiction, so all the cases before EHCR suggest an overlap between international and national obligations. Moreover, the relations of jurisdiction between the Strasbourg court and national courts are very simply arranged in the Convention itself: Strasbourg comes in only if the national remedies have been exhausted.  
The book argues ‘that judges who adjudicate on ECHR rights have a duty to discover and give effect to the morally best understanding of human rights, irrespective of contracting states’ current consensus and drafters’ original intentions and in the face of widespread disagreement about rights’.​[48]​ The book further argues that this view is actually supported by the best reading of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and ‘particularly, by the doctrines of autonomous concepts and evolutive interpretation’.​[49]​
	Letsas’ book has the opposite structure to that of Shany. Whereas Shany’s book starts inductively with a detailed analysis of international law in order to propose general answers as to the relations between national and international law, Letsas’ book is grounded on a robust moral view of human rights that is both universalist and liberal,  which leads to a proper interpretation of the extant case law: 

In this book I argue that the ECHR enshrines human rights that are both legal and liberal: they entail liberal egalitarian principles that impose conditions on the legitimate use of coercion by Member States against persons within their jurisdiction. Legality and liberalism are objective values of political morality that should shape and guide the interpretation of the ECHR. They impose two very important requirements. First, that he benefit of the moral principles which justify the ECHR rights should be extended equally to all Europeans. Secondly, that the ECHR rights should give effect to people’s responsibility for choosing and pursuing their own conception of the good life and protect them against moralistic and paternalistic restrictions on liberty.​[50]​

These statements may not sound original or indeed controversial as a theory of constitutional rights. Nevertheless, Letsas deploys the liberal theory of rights as a tool for the understanding of international or at least European human rights. In some ways he disregards the barrier between national and international.  In the end, Letsas’ theory of the European Convention of Human Rights appears to lead to something like a ‘monist’ view of the relations between the ECHR and domestic law. Letsas writes, controversially, that ‘as far as the nature and scope of human rights are concerned, the fact that the ECHR is an international treaty should make no difference’.​[51]​ Nevertheless, this is not Kelsen’s monism – and in fact it is not monism at all.  This is because Letsas’ view of law is far more sophisticated – at least to my mind – than Kelsen’s. Letsas sees law as an interpretive project, not a chain of authorisation.  He therefore has no use for the idea of a ‘legal system’ as conceived by Hart and Raz. 
An example of how Letsas’ understanding of law greatly illuminates the question of the relations between national and international law occurs in his discussion of ‘autonomous concepts’ in the ECHR. Letsas discusses the case of Engel v Netherlands,​[52]​ where the European Court needs to decide as to what constitutes a criminal proceeding. The book carefully and helpfully records how the Court reaches its doctrine of ‘autonomous concepts’, so that it takes the view that it has jurisdiction ‘to satisfy itself that the disciplinary does not encroach upon the criminal’.​[53]​ This means that the court will take a set of proceedings to be criminal even if the contracting party in question considers it to be disciplinary (and vice versa).  Letsas asks, is this not ‘judicial legislation’? After all, the treaty is a creature of the member states of the Council of Europe. His firm answer is no. He notes the various classifications of the same set of actions must be seen as a kind of ‘disagreement’ over the meaning of certain term or the character of a certain object. He puts this in terms of the normal distinction between concept and conception: 

To use a different vocabulary, applicants propose a different conception of what counts as an instance of a legal concept, say criminal charge…. This idea of legal disagreement, i.e. disagreement over what the legal concepts mean and consequently what the law requires, is the best way to describe divergence between states. For even though it is an apparent fact that domestic legislations very often diverge on how they classify legal concepts, it is equally obvious that they diverge on the same concepts. … Autonomous concepts therefore portray vividly some challenging features of legal disagreement at the international level.​[54]​

But then how are we to resolve these disagreements? Letsas offers the same argument is two slightly different suggestions. The first it that we consider that some concepts ‘transcend’ communal understanding and acceptance, so that ‘disagreement… builds on the idea that the standard of legal correctness may radically transcend the applicant’s legal community’.​[55]​ The second suggestion is that the Court has been interested not in ‘consensus’ or ‘progress’ but in the truth of the rights it protects:  

The above case law shows that the Court was primarily interested in evolution towards the moral truth of the ECHR rights, not in evolution towards some commonly accepted standard, regardless of its content. First the Court does not take the time to look at domestic legislations in some comparative exercise and aggregate what most states do. Secondly, its reasoning is informed by substantive considerations about the protected right, not by a common denominator approach. Third, it emphasizes that evolution is important in that it results in a better understanding of the ECHR rights.​[56]​

So Letsas argues that the Court properly takes its task to be the exploration of a ‘first-order moral reading of the ECHR Rights’. The relevant question is this: ‘given the principles we now believe underlie the Convention, how would reasonable people agree to apply these principles to concrete human rights cases?’​[57]​
 	Why is this not a ‘monist’ view? It is not, because Letsas has no time for the idea that law is entirely made by appropriate officials. He discusses and rejects ‘originalism’ in one of the most interesting chapters of the book. Nothing in his discussion of law and legal structures relies on Kelsen or indeed Hart. His view of law is borrowed from Dworkin’s many writings and applied, often ingeniously, onto this new material. 

6.	SUBSTANTIVE LAW AND JURISIDCTION

As I understand it, Letsas’ view of the ECHR is a sophisticated dualism, which tracks closely the dualism of both international institutions and the national legal orders. Letsas’ dualism about the relations between national and international law starts from the premise that states have their own constitutional orders and control the applicability of international legal sources onto domestic law. But it also accepts that the substantive ideas and principles that form the content of national and international law are common. This means that we accept (at least implicitly) a distinction between legal orders as constitutional orders (say the UK legal order or the French legal order) on the one hand and laws as substantive disciplines or areas of law (say the discipline of human rights, or the discipline of constitutional law or contract law). Every legal order is distinct, but the disciplines of law are not. This, by the way, makes private international law possible, for one legal order recognises what another takes it to be a contract precisely because they rely on a common vocabulary and set of concepts. If we were all national monists, even this would be impossible. It is true that English and French legislators and judges will see things differently in some cases. This Letsas allows as the ‘structural concept of the margin of appreciation’.​[58]​ But at the end of the day, human rights are open to common elaboration by European and national courts because of their subject matter. In that sense the ECHR is both an international and a national document at the same time. 
Nevertheless, in my view Letsas’ argument is incomplete and ultimately unconvincing, at least as it stands. It does not do justice to the first element of the ‘dualist’ view, namely the distinct constitutional order as a set of principles concerning competences, jurisdiction and remedial solutions. There is no account of the way in which a constitutional order authorises – as it does authorise in practically every legal order of the world – international rules and principles and gives  them effect through domestic processes. For example, in Letsas’ account we are left puzzled about the need to join the ECHR in the first place. Why is there the technical apparatus of public international law necessary? Why not expect European judges to simply opt in, in the name of moral truth – shared by all European civil societies alike - and the superiority of the Convention catalogue and case law? 
One way of understanding this problem is by asking the question that Shany asks: what are the jurisdictional relations between the European Court of Human Rights and the United Kingdom courts? A misleading answer would be to say that the Convention itself answers the question because it suggests that the European Court must only be engaged when the domestic remedies have been exhausted. But this is only a partial answer, because proceedings continue even after the main claim has been won. So, for example, what happens if a claimant is facing a hefty costs order while his or her application to attack the original judgment against him as a violation of his human rights is pending before the Strasbourg court? Do we apply the rule ‘lis alibi pendens’, one of the rules discussed by Shany, and stay the proceedings? Or do we enforce the order – to safeguard the interests of the winning party - and sort out the mess later? 
Unfortunately, Letsas has nothing to say about this question. He does helpfully note that the human rights that are at issue in Strasbourg are not strictly speaking international human rights applicable to all peoples, in the way of Rawls’ Law of Peoples.​[59]​ So there is no suggestion of ‘universal jurisdiction’ or anything similar. These are rights established by binding treaties and this is their legal basis. But then, how do these treaties interact with domestic law? The English courts have taken various views on the matter. In Sparks v Harland​[60]​ Sedley J stayed proceedings in view of a relevant pending case before the Strasbourg Court which, he thought, had a good chance of prompting a change to the Limitation Act 1980. He said the following: 

I see no reason why if there were to be such a future shift in the law the plaintiff should have to roll a stone back up the hill which she is at present standing upon. I bear in mind that the consequence of keeping her action in a state of suspended animation is a stressful one for the defendant; but justice in a case like this has to be justice so far as it can be achieved to both plaintiff and defendant.
I would add that if at some future time the law is changed so as to bring an action such as this one within the Limitation Act 1980 (​https:​/​​/​login.westlaw.co.uk​/​maf​/​wluk​/​app​/​document?src=doc&linktype=ref&&context=9&crumb-action=replace&docguid=I6034EB00E42311DAA7CF8F68F6EE57AB​), then equally the balance of argument under section 33 will inevitably have changed in ways which might be adverse to the plaintiff if I were to strike it out now. There would have to be a fresh writ, with consequences that might be more adverse to her than had the action been stayed as I propose to stay it. That I should do so seems to me to be no more than just. It is not giving her an uncovenanted advantage; it is preventing her from being deprived of such small toehold as the law at present gives her.
 
So Mr Justice Sedley’s decision was based on the merits on the case before the judge, not a general view about the ECHR as a legal system or not. 
But there are also English judgments where the courts have refused to stay proceedings while a case is pending before the Strasbourg Court, namely (Locabail (UK) Ltd. V Waldorf Investments Corporation (No.4)​[61]​ and Westminster City Council v Porter.​[62]​ The last two cases both support the view that these are two separate jurisdictions and that the proceedings are separate. In Locabail (No. 4) Evans-Lombe J. explained this very clearly as follows:

The ECHR is not constituted a further Court of Appeal from the courts of this country. By section 2(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (​https:​/​​/​login.westlaw.co.uk​/​maf​/​wluk​/​app​/​document?src=doc&linktype=ref&&context=12&crumb-action=replace&docguid=I2B24CE80E45011DA8D70A0E70A78ED65​), our courts are bound to take into account of judgments of the ECHR in arriving at their own decisions as to the applicability of the Convention. Mrs Emmanuel's proceedings in the ECHR will be against the United Kingdom for failing to provide a court to decide her case which conformed to her rights as defined by Article 6(1). The ECHR will not determine what equitable rights (if any) Mrs Emmanuel has in the two properties in question. Those issues were determined by the deputy judge and his decision has been effectively affirmed by the Court of Appeal so as to make it final. A favourable decision of the ECHR in favour of Mrs Emmanuel will have no effect on that judgment. It will remain finally determinative of the property rights between the claimants and Mrs Emmanuel for the purposes of our domestic law. The only way in which that judgment could be set aside, short of proceedings to have it declared void on other grounds such as fraud, would be by special legislation. It is highly unlikely that Parliament would concern itself to interfere in the property rights of the parties to these proceedings.

Even this judgment, however, does not resort to an analysis of ‘legal systems’. It just reminds us that the ECHR is concerned with violations of human rights by the governments, who are the responding parties in any proceedings. A case before the Strasbourg court is not, strictly speaking, a case before the same litigants, hence its effects must be limited. It is a substantive, not a formal argument. It is a reminder, perhaps, of the rule of res judicata, suggested by Shany and an example where ‘comity’, which is here duly granted, may mean very little.
In any event, all such relations are now covered by UK law, namely the Human Rights Act. If an applicant succeeds before Strasbourg, the UK will be under an obligation to comply both under the Convention and under the Human Rights Act 1998. Under s.6 of the HRA it is unlawful for any public authorities, including a court, to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right. A court may act incompatibly only if it is required to do so by legislation which is irremediably incompatible with Convention rights. Moreover, under s.8 of the HRA: ‘(1) In relation to any act (or proposed act) of a public authority which the court finds is (or would be) unlawful, it may grant such relief or remedy, or make such order, within its powers as it considers just and appropriate’.​[63]​ The combined effects of s. 6 and 8 of the HRA entail, in my view that, within reasonable limits set by the civil procedure rules, any English court will be under a duty to follow the judgment of the Strasbourg Court in the event that it found a violation. But such question of the division of labour between national and European institutions and offices are not addressed by Letsas’ book. 
So, even though I find the book’s discussion continuously instructive and clear and the arguments often brilliant, I am left with the impression that the argument proceeds too quickly. ECHR rights are not moral rights. They are legal rights. This is what a theory of the ECHR and of international law needs to explain. If they are legal rights they are associated with an institutional structure that goes beyond the state, but is also relevant for the national judge. Such rights have their own moral value that needs to be accounted for in some way. When judges are called upon to apply them, they are to look into a public morality, not their own private one. One option is, for example, to say that the value of legal rights depends both on their content but also on the legitimacy of the political order that transforms them into principles of law, i.e. by choosing a linguistic formulation appropriate and understandable to the members of its community. Legal rights have moral force because of their legitimacy, or at least this is one way of putting it.​[64]​ But however that may be, Letsas’ argument in fact skips this step, namely the account of the legal institutions and constitutional structures or rules of jurisdiction that protect human rights in Europe in ways appropriate for each state alone but that also allow the European Court of Human Rights to view rights form the moral point of view, as Letsas convincingly shows us that it does. 
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